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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BARGAIN
COLLECTIVELY: THE IRONIES OF LABOUR HISTORY
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Eric Tucker*

Forthcoming in Labour/Le Travail 61 (Spring 2008)

I. INTRODUCTION
Readers of this journal are probably aware that in a judgment issued in
June, 2007, Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector
Bargaining Association v. British Columbia1, the Supreme Court of
Canada (SCC) held that the right to bargain collectively is constitutionally
protected under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ guarantee of
freedom of association. Less well known is that the court cited the work
of this journal’s current editor, Bryan Palmer, and a number of past
contributors,2 as well as that of other progressive academics and activists.3
Not only is it unusual for labour history to make an appearance in SCC
judgments, but the court’s reliance on the work of the critical labour
historians is, to my knowledge, unprecedented.4
*

Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I would like to thank David
Camfield, Alvin Finkel, Harry Glasbeek, Judy Fudge, Gregory Kealey, Brian Langille,
Bryan Palmer, Sara Slinn, and members of the Toronto Labour Studies Group for their
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts.
1

Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Association v. British
Columbia, <http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2007/2007scc27/2007scc27.html> (18
December 2007).
2

These include Judy Fudge, Jacques Rouillard and Jeremy Webber.

3

These include John Calvert, Harry Glasbeek, Dan Glenday, and Karl Klare.

4

In Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney-General), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016, the court cited the
expert witness affidavit of Professor Judy Fudge for the proposition that farm workers
have been unable to establish collective bargaining without the support of a facilitative
statutory collective bargaining scheme. It should be noted that no labour historians were

2
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Arguably, this event should be cause for celebration. First, the work was
put to a good cause. The court invoked Canadian labour history for the
purpose of reversing a twenty-year-old line of precedent holding that
Charter-protected freedom of association does not extend to collective
bargaining.5 Second, the court’s extensive referencing of the work of
critical labour historians gives it the legal equivalent of the Good
Housekeeping seal of approval. At least for lawyers and law students,
their interpretive claims have been officially validated.
But before we break open the champagne (okay, union-made Canadian
beer), a more careful reading of the case shows the judgment to be replete
with ironies, both in its use of historical writing and in its result.
Moreover, there is much less here to celebrate than readers might have
thought. Indeed, as I will argue, the truth the judgment validates is the
historiography of the industrial pluralists, who see the development of
labour law as a natural process of interest adjustment in the name of
achieving the common good, rather than that of their critics, who see
labour law developing out of class conflict in ways that reproduce and
only somewhat ameliorate unequal power relations. While the court’s
cavalier use of sources may offend academic sensibilities, the more
important problem with the judgment arises from the consequences of its
failure to acknowledge, let alone appreciate, the critique of industrial
pluralism made in the work that it relied upon. This contributes to a
judgment that both exalts and constitutionalizes a deeply flawed regime of
industrial legality at a time when its limits have become increasingly
apparent. Thus, while the judgment provides public sector workers with
some welcome relief from assaults on their collective bargaining rights, it
also endorses a set of ideological and institutional commitments that serve
workers poorly. Before delving more deeply into these ironies, however,
it will be helpful briefly to first locate the case in its historical context and
summarize the judgment.

involved with the case as expert witnesses and, to my knowledge, none were retained to
assist litigants with the preparation of their briefs.
5

The earlier cases were collectively referred to as the Labour Trilogy. See Reference re
Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 ("Alberta
Reference"), PSAC v. Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424, and RWDSU v. Saskatchewan,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 460.
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II. CONTESTING THE NEOLIBERAL ASSAULT
The post-World War II regime of embedded liberalism, characterized by
state policies designed to promote employment, economic growth and the
welfare of its citizens, and which included a commitment to union-based
industrial relations and collective bargaining, began to unravel in the
1970s in the face of a crisis of accumulation. Employers in Canada and in
other industrial capitalist countries responded by pursuing workplace and
political strategies that enabled them to capture a larger share of the value
of social production. In part, this has been accomplished directly by the
adoption of labour management policies that include increased resistance
to and, where possible, avoidance of collective bargaining, shifting from
more to less secure employment forms by using more part-time, temporary
and so-called self-employed workers, and demanding more from, while
paying less to, its current workforce.6 At the same time, they have also
adopted more decentralized organizational forms of production that
enhanced employee insecurity and reduced regulatory protection.7
Finally, capital has sought to shift the direction of state policy from the
weak Keynesian welfare regime that prevailed in Canada after World War
II to a neo-liberal one that pursues the imperatives of global competition,
including the negotiation of free trade agreements that restrict the capacity
of elected governments to regulate capital, amendments to labour and
employment laws that facilitate employer flexibilization strategies at the
expense of working conditions and employment security, reductions in
social spending that provide tax cuts for the wealthy and increase workers’
labour market dependence, and direct attacks on public sector workers’
collective bargaining rights and working conditions.8
6

For an overview, see Leah H. Vosko, ed., Precarious Employment (Montreal 2006).

7

For a recent discussion of this phenomenon and its implications for labour market
regulation, see Judy Fudge, “Fragmenting Work and Fragmenting Organizations: The
Contract of Employment and the Scope of Labour Regulation,” Osgoode Hall Law
Journal 44 (2006), 609-48.
8

The literature is vast. A small selection includes, David Harvey, A Brief History of
Neoliberalism (New York, 2005); Robert Johnson and Rianne Mahon, “NAFTA, the
Redesign, and Rescaling of Canada’s Welfare State,” Studies in Political Economy 76
(Autumn 2005), 7-30; Eric Tucker, “’Great Expectations’ Defeated?: The Trajectory of

4
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The achievement of these objectives requires capital to overcome barriers
erected by past struggles and sustained by continuing popular support.
Nowhere has this been more evident than in the area of public health care,
which continues to enjoy immense popular support notwithstanding
ongoing attacks by conservative ideologues and corporate interests that
stand to gain by its privatization. While frontal assaults on public health
care have not been successful, governments have pursued a variety of
policies that provide private enterprise with entry points into the system,
such as through public-private partnerships (P3s) and contracting out of
support services to the private sector. As well, governments have also
emulated private sector employment policies, whether for the purposes of
facilitating privatization or to control health care costs, usually at the
expense of the least well-paid workers in the system who are
disproportionately women and new immigrants.9
This brings us to British Columbia under the Liberal regime of Gordon
Campbell. Elected in 2001 with an overwhelming majority of seats, the
government moved to restructure the health care system through a variety
of measures, including a reduction of service and the launch of P3
projects. As well, in the middle of the night on 28 January 2002, with
almost no notice to the affected unions and with little debate, the
government enacted Bill 29. The law allowed for extensive privatization,
transfers of service, and hospital closures without public consultation. As
well, it also stripped the existing collective agreement covering support
workers of important protections in relation to contracting out, successor
rights, bumping, and job retraining and placement and prohibited future

Collective Bargaining Regimes in Canada and the United States Post-NAFTA,”
Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 26 (Fall 2004), 97-150.
9

Pat Armstrong and Hugh Armstrong, Wasting Away, 2nd ed. (Toronto 2003); Pat
Armstrong and Kate Laxer, “Precarious Work, Privatization, and the Health Care
Industry: the Case of Ancillary Workers,” in Vosko, ed., Precarious Employment, 11538; Alina Gildner, “Measuring Shrinkage in the Welfare State: Forms of Privatization in
a Canadian Health Care Sector,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 39 (March 2006),
53-75.
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collective bargaining over these issues.10 These changes had an enormous
impact on the largely female and heavily immigrant and older workforce.11
One reason the government may have been particularly keen to push
through a privatization agenda was that the Hospital Employees’ Union
(HEU) had successfully fought a long battle to achieve pay equity for its
largely female membership. Between 1991 and 2001 gendered wage
differences had been significantly reduced and more pay equity
adjustments were scheduled for 2002 and 2003. Since there is no pay
equity legislation in British Columbia, the effect of privatization would not
only be to relieve the government of having to pay higher wages to health
care workers in female dominated jobs, but also the private firms that were
contracted to provide services could revert to paying discriminatory wages
with little risk that their practices would be challenged.12
The HEU, which represented a majority of the affected workers, and the
British Columbia Federation of Labour develop a two-pronged response.
The first prong included public demonstrations against the cutbacks,
mobilization of the HEU membership for a possible strike and, organizing
towards a general strike in support of HEU, although the latter was largely
the activity of grassroots activists rather than union leaders. The second
prong was a legal one, including both a complaint to the International
Labor Organization that the government’s actions violated Convention 87
respecting freedom of association and the launch of a Charter challenge to
Bill 29, on the grounds that it violated the affected workers’ section 2(d)
right to freedom of association and their section 15 right to equality. The
outcome of the first prong of the strategy is well known. The government
did not back down. When the next round of collective bargaining failed to
produce an agreement, and the support workers struck on 25 April 2004,
the government quickly enacted Bill 37, a draconian back to work law that
imposed a retroactive wage cut, increased the workweek without an
increase in pay, and further weakened seniority rights. HEU workers
10

Health and Social Services Delivery Improvement Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 2.

11

Jane Stinson, Nancy Pollak and Marcy Cohen, The Pains of Privatization (BC 2005).

12

Marjorie Griffin Cohen, “Destroying Pay Equity: The Effects of Privatizing Health
Care
in
British
Columbia,”
(Vancouver
March
2003)
http://www.heu.org/~DOCUMENTS/Miscellaneous/Research/pay_equity_final_2.pdf
(18 December 2007).

6
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defied the legislation and were joined on the picket lines by other
unionized workers. As momentum toward a widening sympathy strike
was building, top labour officials and government officials quietly
negotiated a memorandum that slightly modified the terms of the back-towork legislation, and the strike was called off. The memorandum was not
put to a vote among the affected workers.13
While the first prong of the strategy was for the most part being played out
very publicly on the streets, the legal strategy was quietly winding its way
through the ILO offices and the courts. The ILO complaint was filed on 1
March 2002 and was upheld by the Committee on Freedom of Association
in March 2003. The BC government ignored the ruling without suffering
any political consequences, just as Canadian governments have previously
done when the ILO has found them to be in violation of their international
obligations.14 The constitutional challenge was first argued in August
2003, shortly after HEU members rejected a tentative contract to settle the
first collective agreement after Bill 29. Not surprisingly, Garson J.
dismissed the union’s claims, based on earlier SCC decisions holding that
freedom of association did not protect collective bargaining. Garson J.
also rejected the equality rights claim on the ground that the separate and
unequal treatment of health care workers was based on their sector of
employment and not on any personal characteristics.15 The case was
appealed and, coincidentally, argument began on 3 May 2004, a day on
which escalating strike activity in response to Bill 37 was expected, but
which was avoided by the deal reached between the government and top

13

David Camfield, “Neoliberalism and Working-Class Resistance in British Columbia:
The Hospital Employees’ Union Struggle, 2002-2004,” Labour/Le Travail, 57 (Spring
2006), 9-41; Health Sector (Facilities Subsector) Collective Agreement Act, S.B.C. 2004,
c. 19. This pattern of derailing broadening strike movements is not unusual. For a
detailed account of the 1983 solidarity movement in British Columbia, see Bryan D.
Palmer, Solidarity: The Rise and Fall of an Opposition in British Columbia (Vancouver
1987).

14

330th Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association, (Geneva, March 2003),
Case 2180, paras. 301-02. On Canada’s dismal record before the ILO, see Ken Norman,
“ILO Freedom of Association Principles as Basic Canadian Human Rights: Promises to
Keep,” Saskatchewan Law Review 67:2 (2004), 591-608.
15

(2003), 19 B.C.L.R. (4th) 37.
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union officials. Two months later the British Columbia Court of Appeal
unanimously upheld the trial judge’s judgment.16
Leave to appeal to the SCC was sought on 29 September 2004 and granted
on 21 April 2005. By that time, the process of privatizing the jobs of
health support workers was well advanced. Some 8,500 jobs were shifted
from the public to the private sector and wages in the affected positions
were cut by more than 40 per cent, benefits were slashed, workloads were
increased and job security eliminated.17 Argument was heard on 8
February 2006. In the interim, the court issued two decisions, which did
not bode well for the appellants. The first, Newfoundland (Treasury
Board) v. Newfoundland and Labrador Assn. of Public and Private
Employees (N.A.P.E.), held that while legislation infringing a pay equity
agreement violated women’s equality rights, the measure was
demonstrably justified because of the fiscal crisis facing the
Newfoundland government.18 The second, Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney
General), opened the door to privatization of the health system where it
could be demonstrated that the public system was failing to provide timely
access to necessary medical procedures.19 In combination, the result of
these cases seemed to indicate that the court would be sympathetic to a
government initiative whose stated aim was to improve the delivery of
health care while addressing its rapidly increasing cost, making this case
seem a poor choice for seeking a reversal of the court’s longstanding
position that collective bargaining was not protected under the Charter.
So it was a surprise to most court watchers when the court issued its
judgment doing just that.

16

(2004), 30 B.C.L.R. (4th) 377.

17

Stinson, Pains of Privatization.

18

[2004] 3 S.C.R. 381.

19

[2005] 1 S.C.R. 791.

8
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III. THE JUDGMENT
This is not the place to offer an extensive legal analysis of the court’s
decision, but it is necessary to set out its basic argument.20 The judgment
begins with a thoroughgoing critique of the court’s previous reasons for
excluding collective bargaining from the ambit of freedom of
association.21 In itself, this is quite unusual. The court then proceeds to
make the case for including freedom of association based on Canadian
history, international law, and Charter values. We will return to a more
detailed examination of its labour history shortly, but it is worth saying a
few words here about the other grounds. The international law argument
is largely based on the interpretation of freedom of association in
international conventions to which Canada is a party, and in particular to
ILO Convention 87, which extends to collective bargaining. The court
concludes that “s. 2(d) of the Charter should be interpreted as recognizing
at least the same level of protection” as is found in these international
instruments.22
The Charter values justification offered by the court will make trade
unionists blush. It is effusive in its praise of the benefits of collective
bargaining. “The right to bargain collectively with an employer enhances
the human dignity, liberty and autonomy of workers by giving them the
opportunity to influence the establishment of workplace rules and thereby
gain some control over a major aspect of their lives, namely their work.”23
“Collective bargaining also enhances the Charter value of equality. One
of the fundamental achievements of collective bargaining is to palliate the
historical inequality between employers and employees.”24 “Finally, a
20

For a more detailed analysis, see Judy Fudge, “The Supreme Court of Canada and the
Right to Bargain Collectively: The Implications of the Health Services and Support case
in Canada and Beyond,” Industrial Law Journal (forthcoming 2008).

21

Paragraphs 22-37.

22

Paragraph 79. This part of their judgment has been subject to a withering critique by
Brian Langille, “Can We Rely on the ILO? (Don’t Ask the Supreme Court of Canada),”
Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal (forthcoming 2008).

23

Paragraph 82.

24

Paragraph 84.
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constitutional right to collective bargaining is supported by the Charter
value of enhancing democracy. Collective bargaining permits workers to
achieve a form of workplace democracy and to ensure the rule of law in
the workplace.”25
But what exactly is the scope of the Charter-protected right to bargain
collectively? Here the tone of the judgment changes from the expansive
rhetoric found in the justifications to a much more defensive and tentative
one. The court offers several different and inconsistent formulations of its
bottom line. For example, in paragraph 2 the court states, “We conclude
that the s. 2(d) guarantee of freedom of association protects the capacity of
members of labour unions to engage in collective bargaining on
workplace issues” [my emphasis]. This is substantially repeated at
paragraph 19, with the added qualification that the right is to bargain over
“fundamental” workplace issues, but further stipulations immediately
follow. The Charter does not protect all aspects of collective bargaining;
it does not ensure a particular bargaining outcome; and it does not
guarantee access to any particular statutory scheme of collective
bargaining. Somewhat oddly, after identifying these restrictions the court
articulates its broadest formulation of its holding. “What is protected is
simply the right of employees to associate in a process of collective action
to achieve workplace goals”26 [my emphasis]. Unlike in the previous
formulations, this one extends the Charter’s protection to all employees,
not just trade union members, and to all workers’ collective action, not just
collective bargaining. While the first extension remains in subsequent
formulations of the holding, the second does not. Indeed, the majority is
quick to state that its decision does not concern the right to strike.27 The
bottom line that eventually emerges is best stated in paragraph 87: “The
preceding discussion leads to the conclusion that s. 2(d) should be
understood as protecting the right of employees to associate for the

25

Paragraph 85.

26

Paragraph 19.

27

Paragraph 19. It should be noted that the court does not specifically confirm its
previous holding that the freedom of association does not protect the right to strike.
Rather, it states that this judgment does not address this question. Presumably, the court
will be asked to reconsider its position in the near future.

10
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purposes of advancing workplace goals through a process of collective
bargaining.”
Having determined that the Charter right protects the process of collective
bargaining and nothing more, the court then turns to the question of what
duties this right entails, but first several more qualifications follow. First,
there must be state action, which occurs either when the government
legislates or is the employer. The effect of this limitation, which flows
from the structure of the Charter, is that the decision will have limited
impact on private sector collective bargaining law.28 Second, , the court
repeats its qualification that freedom of association does not guarantee the
objectives sought by the association, but only the process through which
those objectives are pursued.29 Third, the court states that freedom of
association does not protect all aspects of the associational activity of
collective bargaining, but only against “substantial interference” with that
activity, a matter which is subsequently discussed in greater detail.30 What
then is the duty that the right entails? “It requires both employer and
employees to meet and to bargain in good faith, in the pursuit of a
common goal of peaceful and productive accommodation.”31 The court is
absolutely correct when it then concludes, “The right to collective
bargaining thus conceived is a limited right.”32
Lawyers will spend many hours (and lots of clients’ money) arguing over
the precise meaning of all this, but the most fundamental point that comes
through the judgment is that government has a duty to bargain in good
faith with organized groups of workers. In this particular context, the
constitutionally protected right to bargain collectively requires the
government to negotiate with its unionized employees over any proposed
28

The impact of this decision on private sector labour legislation will undoubtedly be
explored in future cases, but for the present it would seem that it will be limited to the
claim that under-inclusive laws preclude workers from being able to exercise freedom of
association. This claim was accepted in Dunmore.

29

Paragraph 89.

30

Paragraphs 94-109.

31

Paragraph 90.

32

Paragraph 91.
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changes to existing collective agreements. This does not mean that the
government cannot eventually pass legislation that strips rights from
existing collective agreements, but such legislation must be preceded by
good faith consultation and bargaining over these rights. The court was
unanimous in finding that several sections of Bill 29 infringed the
workers’ collective bargaining rights.
Finally, the court considered the government’s section 1 argument that
even if the government violated workers’ Charter-protected rights, its
action was demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. The
majority held that the government’s argument failed because it neither
considered less intrusive methods for achieving its goals nor consulted
with the unions involved. Deschamps, J. dissented on this point. As the
author of the majority judgment in Chaoulli she was perhaps more
responsive to the BC government’s argument that its action was a
defensible effort to address the crisis of sustainability in the public health
care system and would have found that most of Bill 29’s infringements of
the process of collective bargaining were demonstrably justified.33
The court briefly disposed of the equality rights argument, upholding a
line of precedent that the unequal treatment of different sectors of the
labour force does not violate s. 15 of the Charter because it is based on the
type of work people do rather than on the personal characteristics of the
workers.34

IV. LABOUR HISTORY IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA
Before turning to the court’s labour law history, it will be helpful to
understand its role in the judgment. As noted, the court held in earlier
judgments that the right to freedom of association does not protect
collective bargaining. Several reasons were offered to justify that
conclusion, one of which was the rights to strike and bargain collectively
33

Paragraphs 228-50.

34

Paragraphs 162-67.

12
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were “modern rights” created by legislation, not “fundamental
freedoms.”35 As a result, they were not constitutionally protected aspects
of freedom of association, and labour legislation was designated as an area
in which the courts should be especially deferential to the legislature’s
balancing of competing claims. LeDain J.’s majority judgment, however,
provided no historical evidence to support its conclusion that the right to
bargain collectively was “modern” and so his methodology might be
characterized as an example of what the American historian, Alfred H.
Kelly, scathingly referred to as the creation of history by “judicial fiat” or
“authoritative revelation.”36
One way of challenging the validity of this line of precedent, therefore,
was to attack its historical premise.
A second way of undermining the strength of the earlier line of precedent
was to argue that the framers of the Charter intended that freedom of
association would protect the right to bargain collectively. This requires a
different legal-historical argument, although one that might build upon the
labour history argument. It also assumes that the framers’ intent is
relevant, which is a rather dicey proposition in Canada. Nevertheless, as
we shall see, the SCC did enter onto this terrain, however tentatively.
The role of history, then, was twofold: first, to criticize the historical
reasoning that underpinned the court’s earlier exclusion of collective
bargaining from constitutionally protected freedom of associations and,
second, to provide a justification for finding that it ought to be included.
But how was the court to go about making its historical argument? A new
historical fiat was possible, but because the view that collective bargaining
was a modern right had already become the “common law of history”37 the
burden of proof implicitly shifted to those asserting a contrary position,
and so it seemed advantageous to marshal some historical evidence to
support the claim that the right to collective bargaining was longstanding
35

Alberta Reference, 391.

36

Alfred H. Kelly, “Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair,” Supreme Court Review
1965, 122.

37

Neil M. Richards, “Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court’s Use of
History,” Journal of Law and Politics, 13 (Fall 1997), 889.
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and recognized as fundamental prior to 1982 when the Charter came into
force.
Procedurally, there were several options for making this argument. An
expert witness affidavit could have been prepared by an historian retained
by one of the litigants, but this was not done. Rather, John Baigent and
Randall Noonan, lawyers for one of the interveners, the British Columbia
Federation of Teachers, prepared a factum, or statement of its argument
and the sources on which its based, which contained a seventeen
paragraph history of the development of collective bargaining in Canada.
The gist of the argument was that the right of workers to bargain
collectively was not a mere creation of modern statute, but rather was
based on “pre-existing fundamental rights to trade unionism, collective
The brief relied
bargaining and collective withdrawal of labour.”38
largely on work written within the industrial pluralist framework,
including an article by Bora Laskin written during World War II and a
standard labour law text.39 The brief did not make an argument about the
framers’ intent.
This is not the place to comment on the substance of the teachers’ brief,
but a word about its methodology is in order. Essentially, it fits within the
genre that Kelly described as “law-office” history, and that Horwitz
described as “lawyers’ legal history.”40 This is legal history written to
generate data and interpretations that are of use in resolving modern legal
controversies. To make this history effective, it is best told in a simple
and appealing way. The nuance and complexity that is the hallmark of
good historical work is not welcome in a legal brief prepared for
instrumental reasons.41 Thus, while most labour historians would likely be
38

British Columbia Teachers’ Federation, Brief to the Supreme Court of Canada in
Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Ass. V. British Columbia,
(16 January 2006), para. 25.

39

Id. Bora Laskin, “Collective Bargaining in Canada: In Peace and In War,” Food for
Thought, Journal of the Canadian Association for Adult Education, 2:3 (November
1941), 8-17; George W. Adams, Canadian Labour Law, 2nd ed. (Aurora, ON 1993).

40

Kelly, “Clio,” 122; Morton J. Horwitz, “The Conservative Tradition in American Legal
History,” American Journal of Legal History, 17 (July 1973), 276.

41

For similar observations, see John Phillip Reid, “Law and History,” Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review 27 (November 1993), 193-223.
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reluctant to support the unqualified historical conclusion that the adoption
of Wagner Act model legislation in Canada “does not create, but rather
carries forward and is based on pre-existing fundamental rights to trade
unionism, collective bargaining and collective withdrawal of labour,”42 for
the lawyers that was at least a facially plausible claim that supported their
client’s case.
The use of history by courts, it might be argued, is less likely to be driven
by instrumental reasoning than is the case with advocates. Judges, after
all, are not being paid handsomely to marshal arguments in favour of a
client’s interest. Yet it would be naïve to envisage the judicial process as a
disinterested search for truth. While we might speculate on what
motivated the court to choose this case at this time to overturn its own
precedents, we cannot know for sure. In its judgment, the court cites
several reasons, including Canadian labour history, international law
norms and Charter values, yet it is not clear why these considerations are
being weighed only now when they were equally available in 1987 when
the court rejected them. Indeed, in the interim, the historical trajectory of
Canadian support for collective bargaining has been downwards, making it
more difficult to say that collective bargaining is widely recognized as a
fundamental right in Canada.43 Similarly, the commitment of the
Canadian governments to adhere to ILO obligations also seems to have
further eroded over the past twenty years.44
Whatever its reasons for deciding a case in a particular way, once the
outcome is determined judges are likely to write their judgment
instrumentally, like lawyers do, especially when they are overruling a
previous decision and so are likely to feel a heightened burden of
42
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justification.45 In this context, the preference for lawyers’ history is likely
to be just as strong for judges as it is for advocates. Nuanced and complex
historical accounts will not do when the court needs to present an
historical conclusion as unambiguously true and authoritative. Canadian
historian Donald Bourgeois found this to be the case in a comment on the
role of the historian as expert witness. “The historian should be aware that
the purpose of litigation is to settle a dispute with finality. Whether or not
the decision is historically ‘correct’ is, from one perspective – that of the
court – irrelevant…..The court, ideally, attempts to determine the ‘truth’ or
‘what really happened,’ but that determination is incidental to its role in
society….46 This context creates a high risk not only that the court will
produce history that in the view of two other Canadian historians, G.M.
Dickinson and R.D. Gidney, lacks “context and qualification” and reduces
“a complex and sophisticated historical argument to the level of a crude
and embarrassing parody,” 47 but also that it will make ironic use of
historical sources, by which I mean the use of historians’ work to construct
a narrative that their work actually discredits.
As we shall see, these risks materialized in the Supreme Court’s judgment.
The judges were not content to rely on the Teachers’ brief for their history,
but presumably instructed one or more of their clerks to conduct additional
research. It was at this stage that the work of critical labour historians and
labour law scholars was drawn into the process, even while their
interpretations were ignored.
The historical “truth” that the court needed to prove is that collective
bargaining is a fundamental right in Canada and not the creation of
modern labour relations statutes. The court makes this claim in the
45
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preface to the labour history section of its judgment. “Association for
purposes of collective bargaining has long been recognized as a
fundamental Canadian right which predated the Charter. This suggests
that the framers of the Charter intended to include it in the protection of
freedom of association found in s.2(d) of the Charter."48 This is followed
one paragraph later by a lengthy quote from the 1968 Woods Task Force
Report, which the court identifies as providing the definitive summary of
Canadian labour history.
[W]orkers began to join unions and engage in
collective bargaining with their employers. Although
employers resisted this development with all the resources
at their command, it eventually became apparent that
unions and collective bargaining were natural concomitants
of a mixed enterprise economy. The state then assumed the
task of establishing a framework of rights and
responsibilities within which management and organized
labour were to conduct their relations.49
Having embraced an industrial pluralist historiography, which sees the
development of collective bargaining in functionalist terms as a natural
process of interest adjustment in the name of achieving a greater common
good, the court adopts the three stages of history approach associated with
that school: repression, toleration, and recognition. At this point, the court
acknowledges that this categorization “may not necessarily draw a
perfectly accurate picture of the evolution of labour law in our country”
and cites for that proposition an article of mine.50 In that piece I argued
that the three-stage historiography “served the function of justifying
current collective bargaining schemes by showing them to be the
progressive realization of political and industrial pluralism.” I then went

48
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Paragraph 42; Canadian Industrial Relations:
Relations (Ottawa1969), 13.
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Paragraph 44; Eric Tucker, “The Faces of Coercion: The Legal Regulation of Labour
Conflict in Ontario, 1880-1889,” Law and History Review 12 (Fall 1994), 277-339.
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on to state, “Confidence in the narrative is, however, eroding.”51 Well,
maybe among labour historians, but apparently not for SCC judges who
immediately follow their acknowledgement of their narrative’s
imperfection with a statement that hints at their instrumentalism in putting
history to the service of defending an exalted and, with due respect,
fantastic view of industrial pluralism. “However, for the present purposes,
such categorization provides a sufficient historical framework in which to
summarize the evolution of our law and to underline the flourishing of
labour unions and collective bargaining as well as the historic openness of
government and society to those organizations over the past century.”52
The judgment then works its way through the three stages of history. In
the period of repression, the court focuses on the English Combination
Acts and the hostility of common law judges to workers’ collective action,
while acknowledging the uncertainty surrounding the question of whether
that body of law was applied in Canada. It concludes this section with
Bryan Palmer’s summation in Working-Class Experience that at least prior
to 1872 Canadian law “cast shadows on the legitimacy of trade
unions….”53 Next comes a brief discussion of the period of toleration,
which covers from 1872 to about 1900. Here the court recounts the
passage of the 1872 Trade Unions Act and quotes a summary of the law at
the turn of the 20th century from Fudge and Tucker, Labour Before the
Law, which states that workers enjoyed a legal privilege to form unions
but not a state-protected right to do so.54 The court also recognizes that
workers enjoyed the legal freedom to strike under this regime and that
most strikes were caused by the refusal of employers to bargain with the
union.
The court turns to the period of recognition, beginning with the 1907
Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, which, relying on Jeremy Webber’s
work and others, it characterizes as a failure because employers’ had no
51

Id., 277.

52
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incentive to participate in the process.55 The Depression and industrial
“tension” in the 1930s “rendered” the laissez-faire model “inappropriate”
in the United States, leading to the adoption of the Wagner Act.56 The
court extracts a statement of the objects of the Wagner Act from an article
by the influential American critical labour law scholar, Karl Klare,57 and
turns to Canada and P.C. 1003, citing a description of its legal effects
taken from an article by Judy Fudge and Harry Glasbeek.58 The court
accepts that P.C. 1003 was a political compromise that on the one hand
granted workers the rights to organize without fear of unfair interference
and to bargain collectively in good faith with their employers, while on the
other, guaranteed employers a measure of stability by limiting the use of
economic sanctions. Turning to public sector collective bargaining, the
also court acknowledges that it came later, between 1965 and 1973, and
that the rights conferred on public sector workers were more restricted.
This is supported by a long passage from Fudge and Glasbeek.59 The
court also acknowledges, citing Joe Rose, that governments have
frequently and unilaterally imposed terms and conditions on its public
sector workers through legislation.60 None of this detracts from the
court’s conclusion, in the next paragraph, that there has been steady
progress in the development of the right to collective bargaining, which
was first exercised in the shadow of the law, then was asserted against
employers through the strike weapon, and finally, was recognized as a
“fundamental need” by the adoption of the Wagner Act model in Canada.61
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The historical section of the court’s judgment concludes with a brief
discussion of collective bargaining in the Charter era. The aim of this
section is to argue that by 1982 it was clearly understood that freedom of
association in the labour context included a procedural right to collective
bargaining. This is accomplished by referring again to the 1968 Woods
Task Force Report, the 1972 amendments to the preamble to the Canada
Labour Code that incorporated the Task Force’s recommendations, and a
statement made by Robert Kaplan, the then acting Justice Minister, during
the Parliamentary hearings that took place before the adoption of the
Charter, that it was the government’s view that the freedom to organize
and bargain collectively was covered by freedom of association.62
The narrative of progress concludes by casting the protection enshrined in
s. 2(d) of the Charter as “the culmination of a historical movement
towards the recognition of a procedural right to collective bargaining,”63
implying this occurred in 1982 rather than 2007, so that the court is not
creating new constitutional rights but rather finding ones that are ‘in’ the
Charter.
The court also draws on a second line of historical analysis that is partly
related to the first, and that is the claim in paragraph 40 that the “framers
of the Charter intended to include [collective bargaining] in the protection
of freedom of association found in s. 2 (d) of the Charter.” To a great
extent, this conclusion is a bootstrap argument: if historically a right to
bargain collectively has long been recognized as a fundamental aspect of
the right to freedom of association, then it is arguable that the protection of
freedom of association in the Charter was intended to cover collective
bargaining without further evidence. The claim stands or falls with the
strength of the court’s historical analysis, and that is the way it is made in
paragraph 40. It is, however, somewhat surprising that the “intent of the
framers” discourse makes an appearance in the court’s judgment, since up
to this time the court has been quite explicit in rejecting this approach to
Charter interpretation. For example, in Re BC Motor Vehicle Act, the
court held that “fundamental justice” in section 7 had a substantive aspect
notwithstanding that there was overwhelming evidence that during the
62
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process of drafting and debate everyone intended that it was procedural
only. More recently, in Re Same Sex Marriage, the court explicitly
rejected originalism in favour of the view that the constitution is a “living
tree” to be interpreted progressively.64 Perhaps for that reason, the court
did not directly argue that Robert Kaplan’s statement, noted above, was
evidence of the intent of the framers, but rather that made the more modest
claim it was an indication that the right to collective bargaining was
recognized in the Parliamentary hearings.65

V. THE IRONIC USE OF HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP
There are many problems with the judgment. My focus in this part is on
its ironic use of history. But before proceeding, I first want to argue that
the court’s historical analysis fails to support the two historical
propositions that it seeks to defend, namely that “Association for purposes
of collective bargaining has long been recognized as a fundamental
Canadian right which predated the Charter” and the claim that “the
framers of the Charter intended to include it in the protection of freedom
of association found in s. 2(d) of the Charter.”66
Part of the problem with the court’s labour history is that it elides the
distinctions between collective bargaining as an activity in which selfdirected workers engage regardless of its legal status, as a legally
privileged activity or freedom in the sense that it is not prohibited by the
state, and as a legally protected right with correlative duties on employers
and the state to bargain in good faith. It is certainly true that there is a
long-standing practice of Canadian workers associating for the purpose of
bargaining collectively with their employers. Moreover, it is also true
that, at the very least since 1872 and probably before, workers enjoyed a
64
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legal privilege or freedom to associate for the purpose of bargaining
collectively with their employers without fear of being prosecuted or sued
simply for doing so. The establishment of a legal right for workers to
associate for the purposes of forming a trade union, in the sense that
employers are subject to a concomitant duty not to interfere with their
organizing, however, can only be traced to the freedom of trade union
association legislation passed in the 1930s, while the legal right for
workers to bargain collectively, in the sense that employers have a positive
duty to participate in a process of good faith negotiation with their
workers’ chosen representatives first appeared in British Columbia and
Nova Scotia statutes enacted in 1937, but only became generalized for
private sector workers in the 1940s and for public sector workers in the
1960s and 70s.67
Thus while the court is on firm historical ground when it states in
paragraph 66 that collective bargaining (understood here as a social
practice) has long been recognized in Canada (in the sense that it could
neither be repressed nor ignored) and that “historically it emerges as the
most significant collective activity through which freedom of association
is expressed in the labour context,” its further claim that a procedural right
to collective bargaining has long been recognized as fundamental in
Canada prior to 1982 is deeply problematic as a statement of historical
fact.
To the extent that its second historical claim regarding the framers’ intent
is based on its first claim about the long recognition of a right to collective
bargaining by 1982, then it too is problematic, but the court tries
somewhat elliptically to bolster its case for the framers’ intent by quoting
Robert Kaplan’s statement, noted above. Upon closer examination,
however, the statement is not nearly as probative as the court implies. The
question of the scope of freedom of association arose when NDP member
Svend Robinson proposed an amendment to section 2(d) that would
specifically include “the freedom to organize and bargain collectively”
(my emphasis) in the guarantee of freedom of association. When
introducing the amendment Robinson stated quite specifically that his
amendment would not cover the right to strike. Nevertheless, some
67
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members including Jake Epp, a Progressive-Conservative member, were
concerned about this possibility and so Epp asked Robinson to confirm
that the amendment would not affect the right to strike, which he did, and
then requested Robert Kaplan to provide the government’s position.
Kaplan response was that the government was of the view that freedom to
organize and bargain collectively is already covered in freedom of
association. He also added that the government agreed with Robinson that
the right to strike “would not necessarily be affected” by inclusion of the
proposed amendment.68
We can leave aside the question of the right to strike, except to note that
any turn to originalism would detrimentally affect the possibility of unions
successfully arguing in the future that it is included in Charter-protected
freedom of association. Rather, the question is whether Kaplan’s
statement supports the view that the framers intended that freedom of
association would protect a right to bargain collectively. Here again we
see an elision between rights and freedoms. Neither Robinson nor Kaplan
ever said what they actually meant by “the freedom to organize and
bargain collectively.” Did either or both of them truly just meant a
“freedom” in the sense of a legal privilege, or did they mean a legal right,
in the sense that it would impose a constitutional obligation on the state to
protect organizing and to bargain in good faith with organized employees.
Bryce Mackasey, a former Liberal federal minister of labour from 1968 to
1972, speaking on his own behalf, seemed to be getting at this distinction
in his intervention on this issue, although he too did not make clear his
understanding of what the phrase would mean. “The problem with the
unions comes not from their freedom of association, but to be recognized
legally for another particular purpose; for instance the right to bargain on
behalf of longshoremen….This is something you must negotiate.”69
This is just one instance of the enormous difficulty that is encountered in
making “framers’ intent” arguments, and lends support to the view that,
even apart from the question of whether in principle it would be a
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desirable approach, it requires historians to answer a question that in most
instances cannot be resolved with any certainty.70
I am not arguing that the court should not recognize a procedural right to
collective bargaining as fundamental and, therefore, protected as an
exercise of constitutionally protected freedom of association. That is a
legal and normative claim for which legal and normative argument is
required and, indeed, given elsewhere in the court’s judgment, based on
international human rights norms and Charter values. Rather, my
argument here is much more limited: the court’s historical claims are
flawed.
This leads me then to the ironic use of history, which I defined earlier as
the use of historical work to support a narrative that is inconsistent with
the interpretation of that work (without acknowledging that difference of
view). Unlike the Teachers’ Brief, which relied on ‘safe’ (industrial
pluralist) sources, the SCC’s judgment mines a much wider range of
scholarly work, including the work of many academics who challenge the
narrative of labour law’s linear progress from repression to toleration to
recognition, and who view the Wagner Act model not as the apotheosis of
freedom of association but as a political compromise that allowed workers
to make some gains while also severely limiting and more tightly
controlling their self-directed activity. Here we might just briefly sample
a few of the works cited by the court.
I may be forgiven for beginning with a book I co-authored with Judy
Fudge, Labour Before the Law, but I do so because its time frame is
crucial for the court’s analysis, the period between 1900 and the enactment
of “modern” statutory collective bargaining legislation. Tellingly, the
court does not refer to our book for anything we have to say about this
period, but rather quotes our summation of the legal regime of liberal
voluntarism that existed earlier in the introduction at page 2.71 This is not
surprising given what we say two pages later.
70
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While the emergence of the regime of industrial
pluralism is the culmination of our narrative, ours is not a
tale of linear progress from dark beginnings to the triumph
of industrial democracy and freedom of association.
Rather, our story is a much more nuanced one in which
coercive
and
accommodative
elements
operate
synchronously, in a variety of combinations, and
diachronically, as new laws do not supersede older ones,
but often supplement them, producing a complex legal
regime.72
Admittedly, the prose is not sparkling, but the point is clear enough. Our
book does not support the court’s historical narrative. We use the
construct of a regime because we wanted to show how at different points
in time legal regulation combined elements of coercion, toleration and
support in different ways. Moreover, we applied that framework to our
examination of the construction of industrial pluralism, arguing that the
regime aimed to contain and shape the social practice of workers’
collective action as much as it was about recognizing and encouraging it.73
But rather than acknowledge this difference of interpretation, the court
chose simply to ignore it.
This careless approach to sources recurs a few paragraphs later when the
court quotes Karl Klare’s listing of the multiple aims of the Wagner Act.74
The court, however, does not consider the larger argument that Klare
makes, which is summarized at the conclusion of the section of his article
in which the list appears.
The remainder of this Article will attempt to
demonstrate that, in shaping the nation’s labor law, the
Court embraced those aims of the Act most consistent with
the assumptions of liberal capitalism and foreclosed those
potential paths of development most threatening to the
72
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established order. Thus, the Wagner Act’s goals of
industrial peace, collective bargaining as therapy, a safely
cabined worker free choice, and some rearrangement of
relative bargaining power survived judicial construction of
the Act, whereas the goals of redistribution, equality of
bargaining power, and industrial democracy – although
abiding in rhetoric – were jettisoned as serious components
of national labor policy.75
Again, rather than acknowledge Klare’s critical perspective on the
development of American labour law, and its implications for the story it
want to tell of the forward march of labour history, the court ignores it.
In the court’s defence, it might be said that they really do not need to
follow the development of American labour law, but rather simply wanted
to identify the goals of the Wagner Act because it provided the model for
Canadian labour legislation. But they cannot escape so easily for they
ignore very similar points made by Fudge and Glasbeek’s work, from
which they extract a descriptive summation of the legal effect of PC
1003.76 Immediately after that summation, though, Fudge and Glasbeek
continue:
But, despite the progress represented by this step,
PC 1003 was not intended to alter the balance of power
radically, that is, to ensure trade unions better agreements
and/or to guarantee strong constraints on managerial
prerogatives. The underlying, unquestioned assumption of
PC 1003 was that the touchstones of the then existing
political economy were to remain intact. The enhanced
right to collective bargaining was to detract as little as
possible from the idea that individual private sector
entrepreneurs – possessed of the legal right to deploy their
property as they chose – were to remain the motor of the
political economy. This starting point has had important

75

Klare, “Judicial Deradicalization,” 292-93.

76

Paragraph 59.

26

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 04 NO. 01

consequences for institutionalized collective bargaining in
Canada.77
Later, the court quotes another paragraph from Fudge and Glasbeek on the
more restrictive scheme of collective bargaining attained by public sector
workers in the 1960s and 70s, and then, relying on an article by Joe Rose,
identifies the increasing frequency during the 1980s and 1990s that those
limited rights have been further restricted by legislation. This ought to
create a problem for a narrative of linear progress, but the court makes no
attempt to incorporate these observations into its analysis. Rather, it
simply jumps to its summary: that by adopting the Wagner Act model
“governments across Canada recognized the fundamental need for workers
to participate in the regulation of their work environment.”78
I could go on through a discussion of Palmer’s work79 and others, but I
think the point is clear. The court ignores evidence and interpretations in
the works that it cites that are inconsistent with the historical narrative it
wishes to construct of linear progress toward the recognition of collective
bargaining as a fundamental right in Canada and its realization in the
Wagner Act model.80
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VI. THE IRONIES OF HISTORY
But so what if Supreme Court judges write lawyers’ history to produce a
narrative in support of instrumental ends. Supreme Court judges are not
academic historians writing for other academics, but rather are engaged in
making, interpreting and applying law. Arguably, then, their work should
not be assessed by academic standards, but by its results, in this case the
constitutional protection of the collective bargaining process. Is it just bad
politics and, perhaps, sheer churlishness to criticize the court for writing
bad labour history rather than to praise it for overturning bad precedents
and providing workers with a constitutional shield against government
assaults on trade union rights?
The problem with that argument is that an uncritical celebration of the
court’s judgment fuels, to use Roy Adams phrase, coined in a different
context, a “pernicious euphoria”81 based on an exaggerated understanding
of what the decision accomplishes.82 The purpose of this section,
therefore, is to explore the limitations of the judgment through two
historical ironies. The first considers the historical irony of the court
emerging as the defender of workers’ collective rights at the beginning of
the 21st century when for most of the previous two centuries it evinced
enormous hostility to workers’ collective action. The second is the irony
of the court embracing the collective bargaining process at a moment in
time when it is less likely than ever to secure the substantive values the
court claims that it advances.
For almost any student of labour law or labour history, the court’s
positioning of itself as defender of the collective rights of workers against
assaults by the legislative and executive arms of the state is a stunning
development. This is not just the view of critical labour lawyers and
historians. Industrial pluralists long viewed the courts and the common
81
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law as the enemy of workers’ collective action and an imperative of their
blueprint for institutional reform was to limit their role. Moreover, there is
ample historical evidence to support their view of the courts, both before
and after the enactment of modern statutory collective bargaining
schemes. Courts used the common law to limit narrowly the scope for
worker collective action and later to contain the powers of labour relations
boards and labour arbitrators. Although in its historical narrative, the
Supreme Court refers to repressive common law doctrines in the 18th and
19th centuries, it makes no mention of the judiciary’s intolerant attitude
toward and repression of workers’ collective during the so-called periods
of legal toleration and support.83
How can we explain this rather remarkable development and what
significance, if any, does it have for an assessment of the court’s new role
as self-proclaimed defender of workers’ collective action? I do not intend
to speculate on the court’s motivation for shifting its position, but rather to
draw attention to the context in which it has occurred. The emergence of
the court as the protector of collective bargaining has taken place
following a lengthy period of what Panitch and Swartz aptly described as
“permanent exceptionalism,” characterized by Canadian governments’
retreat from support for collective bargaining in the private-, and, even
more so, in the public and para-public sectors.84 Moreover, employers
have gone on the offensive against organized labour, resisting unionization
where no unions exist and demanding concessions where they do. In
short, unions are weaker now than they have been in decades, suffering
from declining political muscle and economic bargaining leverage. Not
only does their weakness drive them to the courts for protection against
the state, it is also arguable that it is a condition of the court’s shift from
hostility toward to support of collective bargaining. A strong labour
movement was feared, while a weak one can safely be presented as a
vehicle for advancing democracy and equality. Perhaps this change in
83
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union fortunes helps explain the difference between 1987, when the court
denied that collective bargaining was protected freedom of association,
and 2007. It may also help explain the difference between 1963 when the
Ontario Court of Appeal held that secondary picketing was per se tortious
and 2003 when the Supreme Court held it was legal in the absence of
independent wrongs.85
If, ironically, legal victories are won because of union weakness rather
than union strength, this should be cause for concern. The declining
strength of the labour movement has undermined its ability to protect the
interests of its members and of workers more generally through its
traditional syndicalist and political strategies.
This was amply
demonstrated both in the events that gave rise to the BC Health Services
case and in the events that followed it. While the turn to constitutional
litigation may be understood as a continuation of the labour movement’s
post-World War II embrace of legality, the change in the form of legality
is significant and potentially dangerous. Firstly, there is the general
problem of the legalization of politics which entails the shift from more to
less democratic forms of governance. This clearly occurs when the locus
of industrial law creation moves from the collective bargaining agreement
and the legislature (and their respective interpreters, labour arbitrators and
labour relations boards) to Charter litigation. In the former, although
labour leaders generally counseled compliance with the contract and state
law, they also understood that periodic mobilizations were necessary to
win better collective agreements and stronger labour laws. The pursuit of
legalized politics through Charter litigation leaves even less space for
grass-roots activism and struggle that uses a class-based discourse of
rights. As many critics have argued, the Charter’s underlying ideology is
regressive, focusing not on the unequal distribution of property among
private parties, but rather on restraining state power that might be used to
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redress such inequality.86
Although the pursuit of legalized politics
produced a legal victory in this case, it is arguable that in the long run the
practice of syndicalism or democratic politics built on a class-based
discourse is more likely to advance working-class interests over the long
run than is Charter litigation based on a liberal rights discourse. Of
course, the pursuit of Charter remedies does not preclude syndicalist and
popular democratic mobilizations, but it is likely to tilt labour movement
practices even more strongly toward those associated with industrial
pluralist legality.87
Secondly, if judicial protection of workers’ collective rights is premised on
a view of unions as victims, it suggests that the moment that courts
perceive unions to be powerful actors then they will find ways to limit the
rights they have recognized. This can be done in many ways. As this case
itself indicates, the SCC can and does change its interpretation of the
Charter. Moreover, even without any substantive change to Charter
interpretation, the decision itself provides courts with ample wiggle room
to uphold government legislation interfering with collective agreements if
they wish to do so. First, remember that what is protected is a process of
good faith bargaining. Arguably, a government that first negotiated in
good faith with a union about contract concessions and then, having failed
to reach an agreement, legislatively imposed them, would not be held to
have violated Charter-protected collective bargaining rights. Moreover,
even if this was found to be a violation, the government would still have a
chance to argue that the violation was demonstrably justified under section
1 on the ground that it was pursuing a pressing and substantial objective,
86
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that there was a rational connection between the means adopted and the
objective being pursued, that there was minimal impairment of the right
affected, and that there was proportionality between the objectives and the
infringement. The fact that the government negotiated in advance of the
legislation would greatly strengthen its minimal impairment argument, and
a court worried about labour militancy could easily find that the breach
was demonstrably justified.88
Finally, even where Charter challenges are successful, the remedy
awarded by the courts provides workers with few tangible benefits. In
Dunmore, for example, the court found that the exclusion of Ontario
agricultural workers from statutory collective bargaining laws violated
their freedom of association. However, it left it to the government to
fashion a remedy, which it did relying on a parsimonious reading of the
court’s decision. The resulting legislation provided agricultural workers
with protection against unfair labour practices but did not require
employers to recognize and bargain with a union that was supported by a
majority of their employees. The result is that agricultural workers in
Ontario remain unorganized and are back before the courts, having lost
their first challenge to the government’s remedial legislation.nature of the
remedy that is ordered.89 Similarly, in the Health Services case the court
declared that some provisions of the government’s legislation violated the
Charter, but it suspended its judgments for twelve months to allow the
government “to address the repercussions of the decision.”90 What the BC
government will do remains to be seen, but it is likely that it will emulate
the approach of the Harris government’s response to Dunmore and do as
little as possible. Indeed, at least in Dunmore the court spelled out some
minimum protections that had to be provided. The court’s marching
orders to the government in Health Services are even vaguer and,
ironically given the holding in the case, do not even require the
government to engage in good faith consultations with the successful
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plaintiffs in devising an acceptable response to the mess created by its
unconstitutional conduct, although there have been some consultations.91
The second historical irony is that the judgment embraces an industrial
pluralist faith that the process of collective bargaining will advance the
goals of workplace democracy and economic equality at a time when the
limitations of the Wagner Act model have become increasingly apparent,
even to some industrial pluralists.92 Here we can see how the failure of the
court to read or understand the critique of industrial pluralism in the
scholarship it cited contributed to a flawed judgment, even when assessed
from the perspective of what the court said it was hoping to achieve. It
allows the court to rely upon an idealized view of a model that is less
suited than ever to achieve its stated objectives. Perhaps this decision is a
classic example of the cliché that those who do not learn the lessons of
history are condemned to repeat its mistakes.
Let us first turn to the value of democracy. Recall that in its presentation
of Canadian labour law history the court states that by “adopting the
Wagner Act model Canadian government recognized the fundamental
need for workers to participate in the regulation of their work
environment.”
As well, the court identified the enhancement of
democracy as a Charter value that supported the recognition of a
constitutional right to collective bargaining. There is much that could be
said about the limited form of workplace democracy that was ever
contemplated by the Wagner Act model,93 or that is likely contemplated by
the SCC, but that is not the focus here. Rather, the point is that even on its
own terms, the application of the Wagner Act model resulted in a
91
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substantial and growing democratic deficit, which the SCC’s
constitutionalization of collective bargaining rights is unlikely to affect.
Most fundamentally, the model naturalizes a starting point in which
workers have no legal right to bargain collectively unless the majority of
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit, determined by a labour
relations board, choose union representation. In other words, workers
begin from a legal position in which their need for a voice is not realized
and no workplace democracy exists – or at least none is required. Surely,
it might be argued, if collective bargaining is the means for meeting the
fundamental worker need for, and Charter value of, democratic voice,
then the regime’s starting point is the reverse of what it should be. Just as
there is no need for citizens to opt into democratic public governance,
workers should not have to opt into the collective bargaining regime to
gain access to workplace democracy. Rather, some form of workplace
democracy should be constitutionally required, whether it be through
mandatory works councils, as we already have in most Canadian
jurisdictions for occupational health and safety, or compulsory collective
representation, as exists in the Quebec construction industry.94
Moreover, the application of the Wagner Act opt-in model never brought
industrial democracy to the majority of Canadian workers and is
increasingly ill-suited for doing so given the changing realities of the
Canadian labour market. The scheme was initially designed to operate
under labour market conditions that prevailed in the dominant sectors of
the post-World War II economy: large workplaces with permanent, fulltime, and predominantly male employees. The regime never worked well
in secondary labour markets, which tended to be dominated by small,
intensely competitive employers. Not only was it resource intensive for
unions to organize small bargaining units populated by insecure workers,
who were disproportionately female, visible minority and/or new
immigrant, but employer resistance to unionization tended to be
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particularly stiff. As a result, union density in this sector remained low.95
More recently, the successful pursuit of neo-liberal strategies and labour
market restructuring has led to a decline in the share of employment in the
formerly dominant and unionized core of the economy, with a
corresponding growth in the share of employment in historically nonunionized sectors of the economy where more precarious forms of
employment tend to dominate. As a result, the Wagner Act model of
opting into the collective bargaining regime bargaining unit by bargaining
unit is less effective and there has been a steady decline in private sector
trade union density that shows no sign of leveling off, notwithstanding
recent efforts by trade unions to shift resources into organizing and to
develop innovative organizing strategies.96
Of course, this case was about government interference with the collective
bargaining rights of unionized workers, not the problems non-unionized
workers who are either excluded by law from Wagner Act collective
bargaining schemes or by the model’s inefficacy in the present Canadian
labour market. But the court’s judgment touched on these issues in a
manner that is unlikely to be helpful to workers who wish to challenge de
jure or de facto exclusions. As noted earlier, the court was careful to
specify that the right it was recognizing was a limited one. Specifically, it
stated “the right is to a general process of collective bargaining, not to a
particular model of labour relations, nor to a specific bargaining
method.”97 While this does not preclude challenges to de jure exclusions
from statutory schemes, such as the one successfully mounted by
Ontario’s agricultural workers in the Dunmore case, it also does not make
it easier for those claims to succeed. Excluded workers will still have to
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show that absent a protective legislative framework they are unable
effectively to pursue association activities such as union formation and
collective bargaining.98 At best, this will require the government to
prohibit employer interference with organizing activity and require
employers to bargain in good faith with groups of organized workers.99
This is likely to benefit only a tiny fraction of unorganized private sector
workers. Workers who are excluded because the scheme is poorly
matched to emerging labour market realities will not benefit at all. In
short, because the judgment adopts such an unrealistic view of the
contribution made by the Wagner Act model to the achievement of
workplace democracy in Canada, the court is blinded to the irony of its
protection of that model in the name of democracy.100
What about the advancement of the Charter value of equality? In its brief
discussion of that value and its relation to collective bargaining, the court
makes it clear that it is concerned with substantive economic inequality.
Moreover, it quoted Dickson J.’s dissenting judgment in the Alberta
Reference case, which while not naming capitalism, recognized that it
produces inherent class inequality. “Historically, workers have combined
to overcome the inherent inequalities of bargaining power in the
employment relationship and to protect themselves from unfair, unsafe, or
exploitative working conditions.”101
How well does the court’s judgment actually achieve this goal? The
answer is not very well at all. Here too the court begins from a highly
idealized view of the Wagner Act-model, ignoring the critical judgments
98

Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016.

99

The courts decision in Dunmore stopped short of imposing a duty to bargain in good
faith and the Ontario government’s parsimonious response did not require it either. Based
on the Health Services case, it is likely that Dunmore will be extended to require the state
to provide vulnerable workers with access to a collective bargaining process that imposes
a good faith bargaining requirement on employers.

100

For a somewhat more optimistic assessment, see Roy J. Adams, “Is Collective
Bargaining
Now
Really
Free?,”
CCPA
Monitor
(September
2007),
http://www.policyalternatives.ca/MonitorIssues/2007/09/MonitorIssue1727/index.cfm?pa
=DDC3F905 (18 December 2007).

101

Paragraph 84, quoting [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 at 334.

36

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 04 NO. 01

contained in the literature it referenced. As a result, it neither addresses
the limited ambition of the Wagner Act model, nor its increasing
ineffectiveness. With regard to the former, as discussed earlier, both Klare
and Fudge and Glasbeek argued that it was never intended that the Wagner
Act model would shift the balance of power in a manner that would
seriously challenge “the inherent inequalities of bargaining power in the
employment relationship,”102 which are the product of the underlying
structure of capitalist relations of production.
But even if we hold the scheme to a lower standard of equality, one that
was clearly contemplated by the model and presumably is embraced by the
Supreme Court - the amelioration of the inherent inequality in the
employment relation – its success historically was limited and is currently
in decline. There are a number of reasons for this, one of which is the
highly fragmented bargaining structure contemplated by the model, based
on a group of employees of a particular employer at a particular location.
As a result, historically the scheme principally benefited predominantly
male workers in dominant sectors of the economy, both because they were
able to extensively organize their industries and because competitive
pressure on wages could be reduced through collective action. These
conditions did not prevail elsewhere and so the gains in bargaining
leverage were lower, leading to poorer outcomes, even when workers were
unionized. The failure of the scheme to boost bargaining leverage more
generally left large numbers of workers, many of whom were women, new
immigrants and/or visible minorities, dependent on minimum standards
laws, which established floors that were significantly below the conditions
that prevailed in the dominant unionized sectors of the economy.103
Even these limited gains, however, have become increasingly difficult to
retain. In part this is a function of declining union densities, mentioned
earlier, but it is also a result of the effects of neo-liberal policies that have
102
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exposed dominant sectors such as auto and steel to increased international
competition, so that the potential gains from collective action – even if
coordinated on a national level – are smaller.104 Even strong unions like
the Canadian Auto Workers, which split from its American parent in the
1980s in part over contract concessions and which still rejects them in
principle, are now making them in an effort to staunch the bleeding of
jobs.105 The recent deal with Magna in which the CAW concedes the right
to strike and the right of workers to select their own representatives is the
clearest evidence of this trend.106 The weakening of bargaining leverage
has contributed to the decline in labour’s share of income and the
corresponding growth in profit’s share since the late 1970s.107 In sum, the
SCC’s exaltation of the benefits that the Wagner Act model of collective
bargaining has brought in advancing the goal of economic equality simply
does not ring true in 2007.
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Moreover, while the SCC cannot be expected to erect a constitutional
shield that will protect workers against the structural forces of capitalism,
its failure to consider the critical accounts of the historical development of
the Wagner Act model in Canada and its current weakness, enables it to
treat the collective bargaining process as the only form of self-directed
worker activity that needs to be protected, while ignoring the salience of
unequal power relations on its effectiveness as a means for realizing
associational objectives. As the court makes clear the constitutional right
is to a process and does not guarantee a substantive or economic outcome.
Moreover, it does not guarantee access to a particular model of labour
relations or bargaining method.108 Nor for that matter does it guarantee
that workers’ freedom of association will protect their freedom to engage
in collective action in support of their bargaining demands. Essentially,
what is protected is access to some kind of process of good faith
bargaining and the question for the court is whether a government’s action
has or is likely to significantly and adversely impair that process.109 To
determine whether this right has been violated the court will inquire into
the importance of the subject matter that has been interfered with and
whether the government has respected the duty to consult and bargain in
good faith.110
What this means in practice is absent exigent circumstances that would
justify a violation of the collective bargaining process, governments
cannot unilaterally refuse to bargain in good faith, take important matters
off the bargaining table, or nullify significant terms in existing collective
agreements.111 For public sector workers who have been subject to these
practices, this is meaningful, if limited protection. The limit inheres in the
superior bargaining power that employers, including public sector
employers, enjoy, and which is not fundamentally reduced by the duty to
bargain in good faith, a fact amply demonstrated in the private sector
where employers have been able to wring concessions from unionized
workers, sometimes even during the life of the collective agreement,
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notwithstanding that they are under a legal duty to bargain in good faith
and have no legal power to re-open collective agreements.

VII. CONCLUSION
The SCC’s recognition of the right to collective bargaining as a protected
aspect of freedom of association is a welcome one that will provide
unionized public sector workers with a modicum of protection against
government assaults on trade union rights. More generally, it also elevates
the status of the right to collective bargaining from being a political right
to being a fundamental right. The decision, however, is replete with
ironies. On its own the court’s ironic use of critical labour scholarship to
construct an industrial pluralist narrative of Canadian labour history may
not be of much interest to anyone apart from labour historians. However,
the court’s failure to learn the lessons of that critical literature enables it
not only to position itself as the protector of collective bargaining rights,
but also to present an idealized view of the contribution made by the
collective bargaining process to the advancement of workplace democracy
and economic equality at a time when its ability to deliver these goals is in
steep decline. In short the decision delivers too little too late. The
promise of industrial pluralism, even when constitutionalized, rings
increasingly hollow. The labour movement and the Left, therefore, still
face the same challenge they faced before this decision: how to rebuild a
movement capable of achieving genuine workplace democracy and
substantive economic equality through workplace and political action.

